Background. One of the most fiercely debated strategies to increase the number of kidneys for transplantation is the introduction of financial incentives. As the success of such strategy largely depends on public support, we performed a public survey on this topic. Methods. We developed a questionnaire on financial incentives for living kidney donation. We investigated the public opinion on two different fixed compensations: either life-long health insurance compensation or €25 000. Furthermore, we investigated public preferences on the practical implementation: either the patient seeks a donor or the donor registers for donation at an independent institute. For all examples, health insurance companies would cover costs of treatment. TNS NIPO, a professional organization for market research, sent the survey to a response panel that is made representative for the general population. Results. Five hundred fifty respondents (M/F: 60/40; median age: 46) filled out the questionnaire. Forty-six percent considered the situation wherein health insurance companies would introduce financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors undesirable (26% undesirable; 20% very undesirable), compared to 25% who perceived this as desirable (20% desirable; 5% very desirable). The option wherein the donor registers at an independent institute to donate to a patient on the list and in turn receives life-long health insurance compensation was chosen as most favourable. Of all respondents, 5.5% stated that there was a (very) great chance that they would donate a kidney in order to get compensation if such system were to be reality. Conclusion. Although almost half of the respondents (46%) were reluctant towards introducing a system with fixed compensation to increase the number of living kidney donors, still 25% of the general public reacted positively.
Introduction
Financial compensation for organ transplantation is forbidden by law in nearly all countries in the world [1] [2] [3] [4] . Nevertheless, the idea of introducing financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors is a subject of impassioned debate. Some authors seem willing to consider a regulated system of paid living kidney donation, provided that certain conditions are met. Conditions that have been stressed repeatedly by various authors are as follows:
1. The condition of a fixed price, equal for all donors [5, 6] .
The premise of a fixed price model is the egalitarian principle that equal contributions merit equal remuneration [7] . This equal remuneration can be expressed in money, but some authors have argued that remunerations should be expressed in other valuables than money, for instance in health insurance benefits [8, 9] . 2. The condition of a single mediating institute that would be the only legalized body responsible for the reimbursement of the donor. This 'would prevent the rich using their purchasing power to exploit the market at the expense of the poor' [10] (see also [11, 12] ). 3. The condition of more empirical studies on the public acceptance and potential impact of the introduction of an incentive system for living kidney donation [7, [13] [14] [15] . The present study addresses all three conditions mentioned above.
Subjects and methods

Materials
We developed a questionnaire to investigate the public opinion on introducing incentives to increase the numbers of kidneys for transplantation ( version of the questionnaire, see [16] . This questionnaire was based on a questionnaire on the same topic that had been tested in a pilot study at an earlier stage [17] . The questionnaire aimed to investigate public opinion for two different types of fixed compensation: either life-long health insurance compensation or €25 000 ($32 396; £16 930). In addition, we investigated public preferences for two different types of practice: either the patient seeks a donor (as is current practice) or the donor registers for donation at an independent institute. The questionnaire consisted of eight items with multiple choice response categories. Six of the eight items had multiple response categories on an ordinal level (items 1-4, 6, 8) and two items had multiple choice response categories on a nominal level (items 5 and 7). The questionnaire was administered via the Internet to a response panel. 
Statistics
We analysed our data with SPSS 11. For investigating malefemale differences and differences between religious and non-religious subjects we used the Mann-Whitney U test (α was set at 0.05). For investigating the strength of the relationship between age and the responses for single items, and the relationship between education level and the responses for single items we used Spearman's correlation. For investigating the relationship between items with response categories on a nominal level (items 5 and 7) and respondent characteristics we used X 2 testing for binary variables, and ANOVA testing for continuous variables.
Results
We found that 46.6% of the respondents considered the situation wherein health insurance companies would introduce financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors undesirable (27.1% undesirable; 19.5% very undesirable), 21.6% of the respondents were ambivalent, and perceived this as desirable (19.5% desirable; 4.5% very desirable) (question 4, Table 1 ). The option wherein the donor registers at an independent institute to donate to a patient on the list and receives life-long health insurance compensation was chosen as most favourable. Response distributions for all eight items are presented in Table 1 .
Gender. For all items, there was no statistically significant difference between male and female subjects. Only for item 1, there was a tendency for females to be more likely to donate to a 'family member or good friend' awaiting transplantation (P = 0.06).
Religion. For all items, there was no statistically significant difference between religious and non-religious subjects.
Level of education.
There was a small but statistically significant negative correlation between level of education and the willingness to donate to 'someone you do not know' (item 2; r = −0.118; P = 0.009). In answering item 7, people with a higher level of education were more likely to choose response option 3 as most favourable ('a donor donates to the first patient on the waiting list, and receives €25 000'; P = 0.042).
Age. A younger age was positively correlated with the willingness to donate to a 'family member or good friend' awaiting transplantation (item 1; r = −0.255; P < 0.001); a higher chance of donating to receive financial compensation in return (item 3; r = −0.330; P < 0.001); acceptance of health insurance companies paying donors (item 4; r = −0.183; P < 0.001); acceptance of kidney patients trying to find themselves a paid living kidney donor (item 6; r = −0.163; P < 0.001) and likeliness to donate for a compensation (item 8; r = −0.241; P < 0.001). Furthermore, in answering item 5, younger people were less likely to choose against a system based on financial compensations (response option 4; P = 0.01). In answering item 7, younger people were more likely to choose response option 3 as most favourable ('a donor donates to the first patient on the waiting list, and receives €25 000'; P = 0.07).
Of all respondents, 5.5% stated that there was a great or very great chance that they would donate a kidney in order to get compensation if such system were to become reality [n = 30; M/F = 19/11; median age = 31.5 (range 17-82; SD = 13.7); education level low/average/high/(missing): 6/14/7/(3); religious/non-religious/(missing): 17/10/(3)]. Two of these 30 explicitly preferred the €25 000 as compensation; 4/30 preferred the health insurance, 6/30 could not answer the question and 18/30 felt that the donor should be able to choose the preferred compensation himself.
Discussion
We found that 46.6% of the respondents opposed the situation wherein health insurance companies would introduce financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors. If we compare the outcomes of questions 4 and 5, then it seems that although 46.6% of the respondents consider the situation wherein health insurance companies would introduce financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors undesirable, only 38.4% seem truly opposed to this situation. This suggests that there exists a small group of 46.6-38.4 = 8.2% who consider introducing financial incentives undesirable, but apparently not so undesirable as to choose response option 4 for question 5 (see Table 1 ). Twenty-five percent of the respondents considered the situation wherein health insurance companies would introduce financial incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors desirable (20% desirable; 5% very desirable). These results are comparable with results from the study of at Erasmus University Rotterdam on April 4, 2010
Boulware et al. who found that 28% of their respondents approved direct payment to living donors by the government [19] . Strikingly, respondents with lower education levels (and consequently, lower incomes) were not more likely to be acceptant about the idea of introducing financial incentives, and they were not more likely to donate for money themselves, as may be expected. Furthermore, younger people were more supportive of ideas on introducing incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors. This may be caused by the liberal attitude of the younger, but could also be interpreted as a sign of changing societal values. In the latter case, the idea of introducing financial incentives for living kidney donation may count on larger support in the future.
We investigated the public opinion with regard to two types of incentives: either life-long health insurance compensation or €25 000. Although at first glance a life-long free health insurance may sound less attractive than instantaneous payment of €25 000, a life-long free health insurance can mount up to over €70 000 ($90 710; £47 409) in the end, assuming 60 years of benefit of saving €1200 premium per year. In our study, the majority preferred a life-long reimbursement of health insurance costs to remuneration in money. A possible explanation is that this is because the monetary value of the health insurance option is higher in the end (at least, for people under 60, the elderly will of course profit less from a life-long free health insurance). Although this sounds like a reasonable explanation, we think that something else is at stake here. An alternative explanation would be that the public's reluctance towards remuneration in cash stems from a likeliness to associate the concept of 'money for organs' with the negative reports of exploitation of the poorest and the repellant activities of 'organ harvesting' [20, 21] . These associations may induce fears that introducing money as incentive, even in a legalized, well-organized system, will lead to comparable practices. Taking these fears too lightly could harm the 'extraordinary degree of trust' between the public and kidney transplant teams that has developed over the past decades [22] . Therefore, symbolic incentives may be experienced as more appropriate [8] . Especially incentives that are strongly associated with healthcare may be evaluated as more appropriate, because they appeal to societal values of solidarity and reciprocity: 'if you contribute to national healthcare (by donating a kidney), it is fair to receive something from national health care'. For the Dutch situation, this 'something' would be a free health care insurance, but for countries where citizens have health insurance provided by the national institutes of health, one could think of an incentive in terms of periodic (health care) tax reimbursements.
Conclusion
Although almost half of the respondents (47%) were reluctant towards introducing a system with fixed compensation to increase the number of living kidney donors, still 25% of the respondents reacted positively. A younger age was positively related to approval of ideas on introducing incentives to increase the number of living kidney donors. Most respondents preferred a system wherein the donor would register at an independent institute to donate to a patient on the list and in turn receive life-long health insurance compensation.
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